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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





REX GLEN FOUST, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by information with 
Incest, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-102 (1953), as amended, 
a felony of the third degree. The information alleged that 
he had sexual intercourse with a person he knew to be an 
ancestor or descendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was t~ied and convicted by a ju~y 
on November 15, 1977, in the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Davis County, before the Honorable J. Duffy 
Palmer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the jury 
verdict reached in the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony of the victim, Kathryn Foust, was 
not controverted at trial. The victim was the step-daughter 
of the appellant, and was legally adopted by him when she 
was eight years of age (T.5). The incident complained of 
took place shortly before Christmas of 1976 (T.6), when 
the victim was sixteen years of age (T.4). 
About a week and a half prior to a dance at 
Viewmont High School, the victim approached her mother 
to seek permission to attend the dance (T. 7) • The victim's 
mother told her she would have to ask her step-father 
(T.7). Sometime later, while the victim and her step-
father were in the kitchen doing dishes, the victim sought 
her step-father's permission to attend the dance (T.8). 
At that time, the other members of the family were not 
in the house (T. 8) • After asking the victim "how bad she 
wanted to go" to the dance (T. 8), the appellant approached 
the victim and began fondling her breasts while she was 
at the sink doing the dishes (T.9). The victim moved 
away, but the appellant approached her again (T.9). At 
that point he asked if she "wanted to play." (T. 9) • The 
victim responded that she did not, and the appellant angril;' 
left the room (T.9,10). She again asked the appellant in 
-2-
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the living room if she could attend. He said no, and 
responded in part by again placing his hand on her 
breast(T.10). The appellant again inquired if she 
"wanted to play." (T.11). After repeating her request 
to go to the dance, and being told no, the victim 
accompanied the appellant to his bedroom, where the 
sexual intercourse occurred (T.11). 
The victim testified that on several occasions 
she was admonished not to tell anyone about the incident, 
because of the effect it would have on her mother-and her 
family (T.21). 
At trial, the victim was the only witness, who 
testified during the State's case in chief. The appellant 
offered three witnesses, two of whom knew him only at 
work (T.25,27). The third witness testified that his 
reputation for moral standards in the community was good 
(T. 22). 
The State then offered a witness in rebuttal, 
who testified that the appellant and the victim's 
mother moved to Maryland at one point and lived together 
before they were married (T.38). 
At the close of the State's case in chief, the 
appellant moved for a dismissal on the theory that the 
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victim was an accomplice, and that her uncorroborated 
testimony was insufficient to warrant a conviction 
(T.19,45). It is the denial of that motion that 
brings this case before the Court. 
Respondent calls the Court's attention to a 
misstatement of the facts in appellant's brief at 
page 4, lines 2, 3 and 4. The transcript (T.19,20) 
does not reflect that at the time the judge denied the 
motion to dismiss, he also entered a guilty judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD VICTIM 
OF INCEST CANNOT BE AN ACCOMPLICE. 
The issue presented by this appeal, whether a 
sixteen year old female can legally consent to or be an 
accomplice to the crime of incest, has not been addressed 
by this Court since the Utah Criminal Code was amended 
in 1973. 
The crime of incest presents unique problems in 
that it is a serious crime usually committed in the privacy 
of the home with no witnesses, thus making corroboration 
of the victim's testimony most difficult. Also, a child's 
-4-
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concern for family security and respect for parental 
authority often result in the child's silent submission 
to such a crime. The usually concomitant facts present 
in rape, such as torn and disarranged clothing, wounds 
and bruises, or outcries, neither necessarily nor ordinarily 
appear. 
Incest is not a common law crime. It was punished 
by the ecclesiastical courts of England as an offense 
against good morals. Therefore, the crime of incest is 
purely statutory. 
Prior to the revision of the Utah Criminal Code, 
which became effective in 1973, the crime of incest and 
adultery were included in a general grouping of crimes 
entitled sexual offenses, which included, among other 
crimes, rape and sodomy. Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-19 (1953), 
repealed, stated: "Any person who carnally and unlawfully 
knows any female over the age of thirteen years and under 
the age of eighteen years is guilty of a felony." In 
line with this statute are numerous cases holding that a 
female under the age of eighteen could not consent to an 
act of illicit sexual intercouse. State v. Wade, 241 Pac. 838 
(Utah 1925); State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 Pac. 215 
(1900). 
-5-
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In the new draft of the code, the section on 
carnal knowledge was omitted entirely. In addition, 
the legislature saw fit to distinguish the crimes of 
incest, bigamy, and adultery from the crimes of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, rape, sodomy, forcible sexual 
abuse, and aggravated sexual assault by placing them in 
Chapter 7 of Title 76, entitled Offenses Against the 
Family. The latter crimes are included in Chapter 5 of 
Title 76, Offenses Against the Person. Although it is 
not clear at what age a female can consent to all of the 
sexual offenses included in Chapter 5 of Title 76, Section 
76-5-401 provides: "A male person commits unlawful sexual 
intercouse if he has sexual intercourse with a female, not 
his wife, who is under sixteen years of age." In addition, 
Section 76-5-406(7} states that no victim under the age of 
fourteen can consent to sexual intercourse, sodomy or 
sexual abuse. It is significant that no section of 
Chapter 7 of Title 76 makes any reference to an age of 
consent for crimes against the family. In view of the 
fact that incest is a purely statutory crime, we are 
left to speculate as to what the age of consent is as it 
applies to incest. In his brief, the appellant attempts 
to borrow the age of consent stated in offenses against the 
person. Nowhere has the legislature indicated that this is 
-6-
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what it intended to occur. It is of particular significance 
that the age of consent to this crime in Utah has historically 
been eighteen years of age, the general age of consent. 
However, Professor Wigmore states: 
"Whether a participant in an 
incestuous relationship is an 
accomplice or a victim must depend 
upon the facts in each case. 
Obviously the relationship will 
not submit to a rigid rule. 7 
Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940). 
Sec. 2060(b) f.n. 7." Lusby v. 
State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 ' 
at 897 (1958). 
There is a very real difference between consent and 
assent. Consent refers to a voluntary agreement and implies 
some positive action. Assent "means mere passivity or 
submission, which does not include consent." Lusby at 898. 
In the crime of incest, the term accomplice, as it 
is generally referred to, does not have a place. In the 
case of father-daughter incest where the act is committed 
at the suggestion or the insistence, whether physical or 
coercive, of the father, the more appropriate term for the 
daughter is a victim. Her role can hardly be referred to as 
one of aggressive participation, but would more safely be 
characterized as one of fearful submission to a domineering 
figure in her life. The potentially coercive control of a 
father upon a daughter who lives at home cannot be ignored. 
-7-
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"The cooperation in the crime must be real--not merely 
apparent," before a person can be deemed an accomplice. 
State v. Hornaday, 122 Pac. 322 at 323 (Wash. 1912). 
The Kentucky court, in Kinslow v. Carter, 
282 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1955), referred to the daughter as 
a victim, not an accomplice. " ••• In cases involving 
incest between a father and his minor daughter, the 
presumption is that the daughter involuntarily participated 
in the sexual intercourse. • • • " 282 S. W. 2d at 144. The 
California courts have also taken note of the consent-
assent distinction. People v. Conklin, 10 P.2d 98 at 
101 (C.A. 1932). The evidence in this case, which was 
not challenged, is that the father, after making indecent 
advances to his daughter, conditioned her attendance at 
the school dance on her willingness to engage in incestuous 
conduct. Under these circumstances, even though no violent 
force was used to gain submission, the more likely conclusic 
is that the daughter passively assented to the act. The 
mere fact that she was presented with a choice does not fori 
the conclusion that her submission indicated consent. T~ 
choice and her decision reflect nothing more than her 
moral immaturity. In view of the victim's lack of consent: 
-8-
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the commission of the crime, she cannot be deemed an 
accomplice. The more appropriate term is that she was 
a victim. The trial judge, in denying the defendant's 
motion (T.19) to dismiss at the close of the State's 
case, in effect ruled that the victim, in light of 
the evidence presented, was not an accomplice. 
This court recently had the opportunity to 
discuss the statute, Section 78-31-18, which appellant 
asserts supported his motion to dismiss, in State v. Helm, 
563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977). In that appeal, as in the 
present case, the appellant viewed the evidence in a light 
most favorable to his position. This is done in contradiction 
of the general rule of law that on appeal the evidence must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. This 
Court, in determining the propriety of the trial judge's 
denial of the motion to dismiss, must view the evidence 
presented as to the victim's assent in the light most 
favorable to the victim. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the 
victim consented to the act, this Court must then also 
determine that the victim could have been indicted for the 
offense herself. "The general test to determine whether a 
witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have 
been indicted for the offense ••• If he could not have been 
-9-
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so indicted, he is not an accomplice." 19 A.L.R. 2d 1354, 
There is no statutory definition of an accomplice in Utah, 
"but the court has construed the word to refer to one who 
is or could be charged as a principal with the defendant 
on trial." State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458 
at 461 (1937). The court also defined an accomplice in 
State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P<tc. 203 at 204 (1929), 
as one • who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common 
intent with the principal offender, unites in the 
corrunission of the crime. The cooperation in the crime 
must be real, not merely apparent." See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-202 (Supp. 1977), and State v. Davie, 240 
P.2d 263 (Utah 1952); State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347 
(Utah 1951); and Helm, supra. "The burden of proving 
the witness to be an accomplice is • • • upon the party 
alleging it. • " 7 Wigmore on Evidence(3d ed. 1940), 
§ 2060(e). Under the test presented in Coroles, supra, 
the defendant has not shown that the victim acted voluntaril 
or with a corrunon intent. 
Another problem presented by the defendant's 
claim that the victim is an accomplice is the fact that 
under Utah law she could not have been criminally punished 
for her role in the act, even if she had given her conse~ 
and was old enough to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16 
-10-
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(1953), as amended, states: 
"Except as otherwise provided 
by law, the [juvenile] court shall 
have exclusive original jurisdiction 
in proceedings: (1) concerning any 
child who has violated any federal, 
state, or local law or ordinance, or 
any person under 21 years of age who 
has violated any such law or 
ordinance before becoming eighteen 
years of age, regardless of where 
the violation occurred." 
If the victim had been charged with incest in any other 
court, that court would have had to transfer the· case to 
the juvenile court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-18 
(1953), as amended, and the juvenile court would then 
proceed under the act. Incest is a third degree felony; 
therefore, the juvenile court would have to conduct an 
investigation or hearing, and would have to find "that 
it would be contrary to the best interests of the child 
or of the public to retain jurisdiction," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-25 (1953), as amended, before it could certify 
the case to the district court. There is no indication 
in the record that the victim had a prior record of 
delinquency or that the case could have been certified 
by the juvenile court had she been charged with incest. 
In short, she would have been tried in juvenile court, 
and the proceeding would have been civil, not criminal 
in nature. 
-11-
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"The theory of the District 
Juvenile Court Act, like that of 
other jurisdictions, is rooted in 
social welfare philosophy rather 
than in corpus juris. Its pro-
ceedings are designated as civil 
rather than criminal. The Juvenile 
Court is theoretically engaged in 
determining the needs of the child 
and society rather than adjudicating 
criminal conduct." (Emphasis added.) 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 
at 554 (1966). 
As a practical matter, the victim in this case 
would not have been charged with or convicted of incest, 
and the test enumerated by the court in Bowman, supra, 
and advanced by the appellant in his brief, page 5, is not 
met. 
This argument reflects not only the fact that the 
victim could not be an accomplice, People v. Johnson, 2 
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1931), but the policy of the State of Utah 
to protect minors from the consequences of criminal acts. 
The thrust of this appeal is directed at the 
judge's ruling that the victim was not an accomplice. The 
appellant concedes that the question is one of law for t~ 
judge to determine whether the party could have been prosecul 
for the same offense (appellant's brief, pages 5 and 6), an: 
therefore be an accomplice. 
"It is generally recognized that 
whether or not a witness is an uccomplice 
is a question of law for the court when 
there is no conflict in the evidence in 
regard to the acts of the witness in 
connection with the crime, or if his 
connection with it is admitted." 
19 A.L.R.2d 1353. 
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See also State v. Stalker, 151 N.W. 527 (Iowa 1951); 
Alexander v. State, 72 S.W.2d 1080 (Texas 1930); 
Matherly v. State, 71 P.2d 1094 (Okla. Cr. 1937). 
"The essential characteristic of an accomplice is 
therefore criminal guilt." Wade, supra, 838 Pac. at 
839. The effect of the trial judge's ruling on page 45 
of the transcript was that the victim here was not an 
accomplice. In view of the uncontradicted testimony at 
trial, his ruling was appropriate and should not be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
A DEFENDANT IN AN INCEST CASE MAY BE CONVICTED 
ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM. 
"It is now an accepted rule of law in Utah that 
a conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of the victim." State v. Sisneros, No. 15046, 
P.2d (July 10, 1978); State v. Middelstadt, 579 
P.2d 908 (Utah 1978). This holding comports with the 
common law rule that "in the trial of offenses against 
the chastity of women, the testimony of the prosecuting 
witness was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, 
and neither another witness nor corroborating circumstances 
were necessary." 7 Wigmore Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2061. 
Also, State v. Davis, 147 P.2d 940 (Wash. 1944). 
-13-
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The Kentucky court in Browning v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2di 
at 501 (1966), stated: 
"This court has consistently 
held in a long line of decisions 
that under an indictment for 
incest committed by a father with 
his daughter, a conviction is 
authorized upon the testimony of 
the daughter alone, she not being 
an accomplice." 
See also State v. Akers, 328 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1959). 
The record in this case is brief; but revealing. 
The testimony of the prosecutrix was uncontradicted. The 
facts surrounding the incident that she testified to are 
highly believable, and the defendant does not challenge 
the fact that the act occurred. Although he did not testif:
1 
at trial, he had ample opportunity to challenge the occum:\ 
of the act through the cross-examination of the victim. j 
. . . i Cross-examination of the victim revealed no inconsistencies 
in her story, nor did it elicit any indication of antagonis: 
by the victim towards her stepfather. Al though the charact0 
evidence presented by the defendant was directed at his 
reputation for moral character, two of the character witnessi 
admitted that they knew him only at work, and that their 
. i 
testimony went only to his reputation for truth and veracit: 
The unique nature of incest has already been al~ 
to, and the fact that the victim chose to remain silent as 
-14-
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long as she did is not unusual, especially in view of the 
admonitions from her father. It is significant to note 
that less than a month after the event she chose to leave 
her family. 
In State v. Guldin, 162 P.2d 907 (Ariz. 1945), 
the Court held that the defendant was properly convicted 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix and 
noted: 
"Her story of the act did 
not disclose its physical 
impossibility, nor was it so 
incredible that no reasonable 
person could believe it. [Cita-
tions omitted.] This has to be 
the rule. Otherwise many offenders 
would go unpunished. Acts of the 
character involved here are 
performed secretly, without the 
presence of witnesses. The 
character of the act affords 
little opportunity, in most cases, 
for corroboration. Men do not 
advertise acts of this kind." 
CONCLUSION 
It is not clear under the Utah Criminal Code 
whether the victim was legally able to consent to the 
act of incest. Even if she were, the uncontroverted 
testimony at trial was sufficient to allow the judge to 
rule, as a matter of law, that the prosecutrix was a 
victim and not an accomplice. Therefore, his denial of 
-15-
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the defendant's motion to dismiss was appropriate, and by 
so ruling, the judge negated the need to instruct the 
jury on corroboration of an accomplice. It is the law 
in Utah that a conviction may properly be had on the 
uncontroverted testimony of the victim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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